Shareholders obviously seek to invest in companies that provide abnormal positive returns, meaning returns that outperform the market as a whole. Piotroski (2000) stressed that choosing firms likely to attain positive abnormal returns in the future (winners) by means of financial indicators is a task that requires further study.
The present study is an outgrowth of the findings presented by Piotroski (2000) , Gabrielli & Saito (2004) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) . Lopes & Galdi (2007) adapted and tested the proposition of Piotroski (2000) in the Brazilian market and observed that it is possible to obtain abnormal positive returns by analyzing nine accounting indicators to classify firms as winners or losers, according to the expected future return. Gabrielli & Saito (2004) , also studying the Brazilian market, found that companies that announced share repurchases in the period from 1994 to 1999 produced negative abnormal returns. They explained this because of the issuance of CVM Instruction 299 in 1999, which among other measures enhanced the protection of minority shareholders in public tender offers. They also found that the variation in the concentration of winners and losers could be an explanation for the variation in the sign of abnormal returns.
In light of the above, this article investigates the question: Is there a relation between share repurchase announcements and abnormal returns of firms classified as winners and losers in the Brazilian market?
Various explanatory variables of abnormal returns have been studied, such as price-to-book, size, liquidity and leverage (debt/assets) (Fama & French, 1996; Ho, Liu & Ramanan, 1997; Ikembery, Lakonishok & Vermaellen, 2000; Dittmar, 2000;  D 'Mello & Shroff, 2000; Piotroski, 2000; and Lopes & Galdi, 2007) .
Here I use panel regression with fixed effects to study the relation between abnormal returns, as the dependent variable, and the following explanatory variables:
classification as winner or loser; firms that announce share repurchase; and the temporal impact found by Gabrielli & Saito (2004) . I also employ some of the main control variables indicated in the literature, such as price-to-book (Fama & French, 1996) , liquidity, size and indebtedness (Piotroski, 2000 and Galdi, 2007) .
This study helps give a better empirical view of the relationship of share repurchase programs and fundamental analysis with abnormal returns, by providing new information about the Brazilian market.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Portfolios chosen by fundamental analysis
The relevance of accounting for the capital market has been examined by Ball & Brown (1968) , Baruch & Thiagarajan (1993) , Fama & French (1996) , Abarbanell & Bushee (1997) , Abarbanell & Bushee (1998) , Ali & Hwang (2000) , Bird, Gerlach & Hall (2001) , Piotroski (2000; 2005) , Mohanram (2005) , and Lopes & Galdi (2007) , among other researchers who have studied the relation of accounting indicators and stock returns, to give investors a better chance to obtain good returns. Piotroski (2000) used financial information on American firms in the period from 1976 to 1996 to calculate an "F_Score" to classify firms as winners or losers and suggested that one of the strategies investors could use to find a balance between risk and return would be to observe financial indicators, distribution of dividends, accruals, stock issues and repurchase programs. Lopes & Galdi (2006) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) suggested some adaptations to the F_Score proposed by Piotroski (2000) , to adapt it to the peculiarities of the Brazilian market, and also proposed the use of another score, called the R_Score, based on some quasi-continuous indicators.
In applying the F_Score and R_Score to the Brazilian market, Lopes & Galdi (2007) corroborated the results found by Piotroski (2000) positive relation between a portfolio of winners and abnormal returns, especially in the second year after building the portfolio.
Both Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) observed an opportunity to use financial information as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry. However, Lopes & Galdi (2007) stressed that the economic reality represented by financial ratios appears to be incorporated more slowly in the price of Brazilian shares than in American ones.
Price-to-book, size, liquidity and leverage
I use the variables price-to-book, firm size, liquidity and leverage (debt/assets) as control variables. These have been tested in previous articles to explain abnormal returns (Fama & French, 1996; Ho, Liu & Ramanan, 1997; Ikembery, Lakonishok & Vermaellen, 2000; Dittmar, 2000; D'Mello & Shroff, 2000; Piotroski, 2000; and Lopes & Galdi, 2007) .
Size was used as a control variable by D 'Mello & Shroff (2000) , Dittmar (2000) and Ho, Liu & Ramanan (1997) . In the Brazilian market, Lopes & Galdi (2007) concluded that if an investor bought shares of winners and sold them in one year or two years, he would obtain a positive abnormal return of 8.3% or 11.5%, respectively.
If this same investor invested only in winning small and medium sized firms, the abnormal return would rise to 34.5% if selling after one year and 98.2% if waiting two years.
This result is different than that of Piotroski (2000) , according to which the efficiency of a portfolio of winners is independent of the firms' size.
According to Bezerra & Lopes (2004) , in the Brazilian market preferred shares have the highest liquidity. On the matter of liquidity, Lopes & Galdi (2007) found evidence that the returns of winners and losers are different for firms with low liquidity in the Brazilian market.
The leverage indicator (debt/assets) was studied by Piotroski (2000) , who
observed that a strategy of separating winners from losers works independently of the level of firms' indebtedness. In the Brazilian market, Lopes & Galdi (2007) found evidence that a strategy of separating winners from losers is more efficient for firms with higher leverage. 
Repurchase of shares and fundamental analysis
The repurchase by firms of their own shares is defined by Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe (2002) , Grullon & Michaelly (2002 , p. 1675 , Gabrielli & Saito (2004) and Piotroski (2000) as a strategy that can have several aims: to reduce agency cost, to take the place of paying dividends, to manage capital structure and to signal to the market that a firm's shares are undervalued.
The fact that some firms signal events that generate positive abnormal returns and others signal events that generate negative abnormal returns is based on agency conflict, according to Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Akerlof (1970) . With respect to signaling theory, Spence (1973) argued that by adopting certain practices, firms can send neutral, positive or negative signals to interested parties.
Searching for an explanation, by empirical testing, for the fact that firms repurchase their own shares, Dittmar (2000) observed that firms do this to distribute cash, manage their leverage and as part of employee and management stock option plans. Bens & Wong (2007) corroborated the result found by Dittmar (2000) , referring to management of earnings per share to increase the value of stock options. Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 308) argued that agents with access to information about the firm can use it in their own personal interests, in detriment to those of the shareholders.
In analyzing stock repurchase based on signaling theory, Dielman, Tinothy & Wright (1980) , Dann (1981 ), Vermaelen (1981 , Lakonishok & Vermaelen (1990) , Liano, Huang & Manakyan(1990) , Comment & Jarrell (1991) , Ikenberry, Lakonishok & Vernaelen (2000) , D 'Mello & Shroff (2000) , Dittmar (2000) , Grullon & Michaelly (2002) , Lie (2005) , and Bens & Wong (2007) all observed positive returns for companies that announced stock buybacks.
In contrast, the results of the study by Stephens & Wisbash (1998) Although the focus of this study is on the effects of CVM Instruction 299/1999, highlighted by Gabrielli & Saito (2004) shares express their intention of participating in the repurchase auction, the company must: "(i) withdraw the offer; (ii) proceed with the acquisition in proportion to the number of shares owned by shareholders accepting the offer, up to the limit of one-third of the shares in circulation; or (iii) initiate a new public tender offer procedure." Gabrielli & Saito (2004) concluded that before the application of CVM Instruction 299/1999, share repurchases led to accumulated abnormal returns of negative 10%, while afterward this figure was positive 4%. In other words, there is evidence that this instruction benefited minority shareholders (Gabrielli & Saito, 2004) .
The result of the study by Gabrielli & Saito (2004) indicates that the new rules provided by CVM Instruction 299/1999 were a factor to explain the variation in abnormal returns of companies that announced share repurchases in the period analyzed.
However, besides this change in the regulatory framework, there are other factors that can explain the abnormal returns after share repurchase offers.
As explained by Fama & French (1996) , Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) , among these factors are price-to-book, liquidity, size, leverage and the classification as winner or loser. The strategy of building a portfolio containing the shares of companies satisfying certain financial indicators and that repurchase shares is aimed at increasing the probability of obtaining positive abnormal returns. In this respect, Ho, Liu & Ramanan (1997) , besides stressing the importance of accounting numbers to investors, observed that share repurchase is positively related to earnings per share and growth of sales between the period before and after the announcement.
D 'Mello & Shroff (2000 , p. 2422 ) separated firms by their stock price as undervalued or overvalued, by applying the model of Ohlson (1995) and controlling for size. D 'Mello & Shroff (2000) concluded that small firms that announce share repurchases attain better returns than large firms doing the same.
Lie (2005) studied companies that announced share repurchases and analyzed their earnings disclosures, concluding that the market reacts more favorably to disclosure of earnings and operational performance in the case of companies that carry out the repurchase in the same year as announced than to firms that do not do so within the same year.
METHODOLOGY
This paper is in the positive accounting research tradition, based on analysis of empirical data about companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) from 1994 to 2006. It is an extension of the observations of Lopes & Galdi (2007) and Gabrielli & Saito (2004) regarding the Brazilian market. Lopes & Galdi (2007) stated that by using accounting information it is possible to separate winning from losing companies according to the expectation of abnormal stock returns. In turn, Gabrielli & Saito (2004) found that Brazilian firms that repurchased shares in the period before CVM Instruction 299/1999 obtained a negative average abnormal return, while firms that did so after the change in rules attained a positive average abnormal return.
Based on these findings, one would expect there to be a relation between abnormal returns and the announcement of share repurchases by winners and losers.
The null hypothesis tested here is thus: H0: There is no relation between the announcement of stock repurchase by winners or losers and abnormal returns.
I tested this null hypothesis considering the periods before and after the publication of CVM Instruction 299/1999, to verify whether this variable had any influence on the abnormal returns beforehand and afterward.The method for classifying 
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∆LEVER < 0 (1) ∆LEVER > 0 (0) EQ_OFFER If the company issued equity in the last year before forming the portfolio, then it receives a value of zero (o), and one (1) if it did not issue equity.
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Source: Adapted from Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) .
Where:
CHART 1: VARIABLES FROM TABLE 1 Source: Adapted from Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007 further attributed a score of one to firms with CF greater than ROA, and zero to firms with CF less than ROA.
Capital structure indicators -I assigned a score of one to firms with variation in liquidity greater than zero, and zero to firms with variation in liquidity less than zero. I also assigned a value of one to firms with variation in leverage less than zero, and zero to firms where this variation was greater than zero. Finally, I attributed a score of one to firms that issued shares (equity offer) in the year before formulation of the portfolio and zero to firms that did not issue shares. Operational efficiency indicators -I attributed a score of one to firms presenting a change in margin indicator greater than zero, and zero to firms with a variation in margin less than zero. Likewise, I assigned a score of zero to firms with variation in asset turnover greater than zero and zero to firms where this variation was less than zero. Based on this scheme, the nearer to nine the total score is, the more winning the firm is.
After formulating the scheme for calculating the F_Scores, I examined the Economática database for firms that announced a share repurchase in the study period.
There were 1,268 such announcements, of which 281 announcements (at least one announcement per company in each year) corresponded to companies with financial information and the other variables available. These formed the panel for testing.
The use of a portfolio chosen two years before the repurchase announcement was based on the results found by Lopes & Galdi (2007) , according to which the strategy of separating firms into winners and losers with respect to abnormal returns particularly occurs two years after choosing the portfolio.From the F_Score of the companies that announced share repurchases, I classified those in the top 20% as winners and those in the lowest 20% as losers, following the classification parameters proposed by Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) . Also following Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) , I excluded firms with negative equity. I also 
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There are other names for panel data, such as pooled data (pooling of time and cross-sectional observations), combination of time series and crosssectional data, longitudinal data (a study over time of a variable or group of subjects), event history analysis, (e.g., studying the movement over time of subjects through successive states or conditions), cohort analysis (e.g., following the career paths of 1965 graduates of a business school).
According to Gujarati (2006, p. 637) , the use of regression analysis with panel data allows representing in a single equation abnormal returns and the various combinations of winners and losers that did and did not announce share repurchases. It can also take into consideration the temporal impact found by Gabrielli & Saito (2004) and also allow the insertion of control variables indicated in the literature, such as priceto-book (Fama & French, 1996) , liquidity, size and leverage (Piotroski, 2000 and Galdi, 2007) .
Abnormal return (ARit), according to Sarlo Neto (2004), is the difference between the rate of return of an asset (Equation 1) and its expected return (Equation 2).
(1) Fama & French (1996) , Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) .
(RA it )  abnormal return of asset i and t  year of the repurchase announcement  0  intercept  Winner it  2 = company that announced a share repurchase and that was classified two years beforehand as a winner. It is a dummy variable that assumes the value of one for winners that announced a repurchase and zero for companies that are not winners.
 Loserit2  company that announced a share repurchase and that was classified two years beforehand as a loser. It is a dummy variable that assumes the value of one for losers that announced a repurchase and zero for other companies. In calculating the price-to-book ratio for the period before the announcement, I
followed the proposal of Brown, Lo & Lys (1999) to eliminate the scale effect.
Equation 5 includes in the model the time differentiation found by Gabrielli & Saito (2004) , according to which in the period before CVM Instruction 299/1999, companies that announced share repurchases were sending negative signals to the market while afterward repurchase announcements started to be a positive signal.
The periods before and after CVM Instruction 299/1999 are represented by a dummy, which is zero for the preceding period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) and one for the succeeding one (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , in each case multiplied by a winner/loser dummy variable. To decide between panel data regression analysis with fixed or random effects, I
used the Hausman test (Tables 2 and 3) , which according to Greene (1997) and
Wooldridge (2006) Another test conducted to make the results more robust is the use of leverage as a control variable. Both Piotroski (2000) and Lopes & Galdi (2007) employed the debtto-assets ratio as the leverage indicator.
In this study I also used the debt-to-equity ratio and found no significant difference in the Brazilian market between the outcomes, as shown in Appendix C.
Therefore, I only consider debt/assets as the leverage variable in the results.
Wooldridge (2006, p. 445) states that using panel regression with "fixed effects is the same as allowing a different intercept for each observation, and we can estimated these intercepts by including dummy variables...".
Based on this, I carried out a pooled regression analysis to check whether the results found by panel regression with fixed effects were consistent with those found by pooled regression (Appendix B), although the robust tool is not used in pooled regressions.
The results are constructed from panel regression analysis with fixed effects and the robustness tool, which according to Greene (1997, p. 635) can correct possible problems due to the existence of heteroskedasticity. Appendix A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used, in general and separately for firms classified as winners and losers.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
This section presents the results and analysis of the panel regression, to answer the research question: Is there a relation between share repurchase announcements and abnormal returns by firms classified either as winners or losers? Table 2 . Equation 3 ). This means that investors do not respond in statistically significant form to stock repurchase announcements, for either winners or losers. Although the relation of the winners and losers is not significant, the sign of the winners' coefficient (p-value = 0.13) is positive, while the sign of the losers' coefficient (p-value = 0.74) is negative.
In the panel analysis (Equation 4), I separately analyzed the winners and losers that announced share repurchases in the two sub-periods (1994-1999 and 2000-2006) , by multiplying the time dummy by the dummy variables D.Winner or D.Loser. Table 3 shows there was of a statistically significant (at 1%) inverse relationship between abnormal returns and announcements by losers of share buybacks in the earlier period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . In other words, investors reacted negatively, by means of the stock price, when firms classified as losers announced share repurchases in that period.
The same analysis for winners in that period did not reveal any significant relation, although the sign of the coefficient of the firms classified as winners was positive. 
F Hausman -0.91 0.14 -0.63 0.22 0.24 -0.12 0.03 0.12 0.99 0.00 0.00 (-0.66) (0.63) (-4.30)* (1.94)*** (1.98)*** (-12.01)* (0.31) (1.60) (4.99)* Note: *,**,*** mean significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (t-statistic in parentheses) Source: elaborate by the authors The analysis of the relation between abnormal returns and share repurchase announcements in the later period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) revealed a positive and significant relation for both winners and losers (Table 3 ).
The signs of beta1, beta2, beta3 and beta4, (Table 3) However, the analysis of these two sub-periods separately for winners and losers showed that in the period from 1994 to 1999, the market reacted negatively to stock repurchase announcements by losers, while for winners there was no significant effect on abnormal returns.
In contrast, in the period from 2000 to 2006, announcements by both winners and losers had a positive effect on abnormal returns. Therefore, the null hypothesis that "there is no relation between the announcement of stock repurchase by winners or losers and abnormal returns" was rejected. 
